

Do Asset Price Drops Foreshadow Recessions?

Motivation

Questions and
Contributions

Data and
Model

Empirical
Results

Baseline
Robustness
One-step ahead
classification

Conclusion

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 - 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression
 - Early 1990s asset price collapse and recession in Japan
 - 2008 asset price crash and the Great Recession

Empirical and theoretical links

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 - Negative effect on firms' and banks' balance sheets, reducing investment and lending.

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 - Negative wealth effect on households, dampening consumption.
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 - Asset prices are forward-looking, reflecting future economic conditions. Changes in asset prices contain information about future growth.

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- Does the nature of the relationship between asset price drops and downturns change with the severity of recessions?
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 - Explore non-linearities in the relationship between equity prices and recessions.

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- Sample consists of the G-7 economies, covering 1970:Q1-2011:Q4.

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
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
- Country fixed effects and quarterly dummies included in all specifications unless otherwise indicated.


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- All explanatory variables are **once-lagged** unless otherwise indicated.







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
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
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Frequency Distribution of Negative Real Equity Price Growth Conditional on Business Cycle Phase



Note: The conditioning variable is once-lagged. Growth rates are expressed as changes in log levels of the series times 100. The expansion period density excludes the year before a peak. Year before a peak includes the peak. The p -value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of densities is 0.002.

Predicting Recessions in the G-7 Baseline Results, 1970:Q1-2011:Q4

<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	Logistic Regression Model						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Real Equity	-0.0832***					-0.328***	-0.312***
Price Growth	(0.0216)					(0.0991)	(0.0998)
Term Spread		-0.529***					-0.463***
		(0.1700)					(0.1770)
Log Real			0.856***				0.948***
Oil Price			(0.2510)				(0.2560)
Real House				0.0126			0.003
Price Growth				(0.0416)			(0.0408)
Negative Real Equity					-0.0792**	0.301***	0.281***
Price Growth					(0.0323)	(0.1140)	(0.1040)
No. of Obs.	948	948	948	948	948	948	948
AUC	0.787	0.77	0.733	0.703	0.749	0.799	0.844

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
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
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
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Predicting Recessions in the G-7
Robustness to Estimation Method, 1970:Q1-2011:Q4

<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	Estimation Method			
	Baseline	Firth's Bias Correction	Complementary Log-Log	King and Zeng's Correction
Real Equity	-0.312***	-0.278***	-0.308***	-0.277***
Price Growth	(0.0998)	(0.1010)	(0.0985)	(0.0930)
Term Spread	-0.463***	-0.440***	-0.412***	-0.439***
Baseline	(0.1770)	(0.0983)	(0.1580)	(0.1140)
Log Real	0.948***	0.902***	0.951***	0.903***
Oil Price	(0.2560)	(0.3180)	(0.2310)	(0.3130)
Real House	0.003	0.000548	0.0114	-0.000181
Price Growth	(0.0408)	(0.0679)	(0.0388)	(0.0712)
Negative Real Equity	0.281***	0.245**	0.290***	0.244**
Price Growth	(0.1040)	(0.1150)	(0.0991)	(0.1100)
No. of Obs.	948	948	948	948
AUC	0.844	0.844	0.84	0.844

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- Most contributed little (insignificant and no change in AUC):
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
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- Only rate of exchange rate depreciation versus the USD was significant.
- Estimated coefficients on the baseline variables were roughly unchanged across all models.
- Baseline also robust to inclusion of additional lags (4 total).

We also looked at how the model performed in predicting severe recessions (deep in terms of output fall).

Predicting Severe Recessions in the G-7
Baseline Results, 1970:Q1-2011:Q4

<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	Logistic Regression Model						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Real Equity	-0.102***					-0.602***	-0.571***
Price Growth	(0.0240)					(0.1680)	(0.2030)
Term Spread		-0.714***					-0.645***
		(0.2000)					(0.2030)
Log Real			1.365***				1.653***
Oil Price			(0.3930)				(0.4970)
Real House				0.076			0.0626**
Price Growth				(0.1020)			(0.0314)
Negative Real Equity					-0.0928***	0.583***	0.516**
Price Growth					(0.0302)	(0.1740)	(0.2050)
No. of Obs.	467	467	467	467	467	467	467
AUC	0.801	0.811	0.739	0.702	0.756	0.823	0.901

Overall performance out-of-sample



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
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- Predictions are generally too low to merit interpretation as probabilities.
- When viewed as a classification problem, then the model does well for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
- However, it performs poorly for Canada and the United States.
- More work needed to inspect country-by-country.

- Focus on identifying *new* recessions with simple model centered on a few financial variables.
- Equity price growth, term spread, and oil price are significantly associated with new recessions, while house prices are not.
- Non-linearities evident in the effect of equity prices, with equity price drops showing larger effects (in absolute terms) than rises.
- Next steps . . .
 - more in-depth, out-of-sample analysis
 - country-by-country investigation \Rightarrow the rare events problem can be acute in these cases, likely necessitating the use of one of the alternative estimation methods.